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Abstract
This article identifies and clarifies some of the miscommunication between Chinese 
and English in the discussion of rule of law or rule by law. “Rule by law” is not a con-
cept readily understandable by a Chinese audience because there is no acceptable 
translation or equivalent in Chinese. At the same time, the historical and contextual 
significance of the different denotations of “rule of law” in Chinese is often over-
looked in an English-speaking environment. Meanwhile, the abstraction in critical 
examination of Chinese law often masks significant changes taking place in China’s 
construction of a “socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics”, such as the emer-
gence of a system of case law. The different components and aspects of such a system, 
ranging from the guidance cases system published by the Supreme People’s Court, to 
the largest database of judicial decisions in the world, and the newly established China 
International Commercial Court under the Belt and Road Initiative could fundamen-
tally alter and structure, nature and principles of Chinese law as we know it.
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1 Introduction
It is evident that the rise of China, underlined by its economic power and 
growth, now has profound impact on the world across a wide realm such as 
culture, politics and technology. Chinese law, however, has so far been a rather 
self-contained area with minimal external influence in comparison to other 
institutions of general importance in modern society. On the practical side, 
Chinese law does not seem to concern persons and organizations outside of 
China. Within academia, many substantive scholarly studies of Chinese law 
written in English often focus on what China can learn from the more estab-
lished Western legal systems, especially in specific branches of the law, say 
intellectual property or environmental protection. To put it more bluntly, the 
question being asked is often how Chinese law is different from the law of 
the US or European countries and how Chinese law can be improved based on 
such comparative knowledge. While such an approach is undoubtedly valu-
able, it tends to leave a void in the understanding of the more systemic and 
fundamental changes that happen in Chinese law among the audience outside 
of China. In other words, what is often not being scrutinized is how Chinese 
law is different and changing fast, and how this could alter our understanding 
of Chinese law and its influence both in and out of China.
This article seeks to make its contribution towards filling that gap through 
critical examination of a series of ongoing changes in the Chinese legal system 
that have not received the attention their importance would warrant so far. It 
will start by identifying the typical miscommunication between English and 
Chinese on the issue of the rule of law or rule by law, including the contextual 
importance of the seemingly cosmetic amendment of the Chinese constitu-
tion on the socialist rule of law. It will then focus on the gradual emergence of 
a system of the use of cases against the background of a Civil Law jurisdiction, 
by examining the different perspectives of the system of guiding cases from 
the Supreme People’s Court, the China Judgement Online Database, and the 
potential impact of the establishment of the China International Commercial 
Court under the Belt and Road Initiative.
2 Rule of Law—Lost in Translation
Since 1999, the Constitution of China states that “[t]he People’s Republic of 
China governs the country according to law and makes it a socialist country 
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under rule of law”.1 The criticism that China is not a rule of law country has 
never subsided. In March 2018, the National People’s Congress adopted the first 
set of constitutional amendment in more than a decade. Among other changes 
that caught international attention, most notably the removal of the two-
term limit for the position of the President, the statement in the Preamble on 
“improving the socialist legal system” was rewritten as “improving the socialist 
rule of law”. It seems fair to suggest that many commentators outside of China, 
especially those not familiar with the subtlety of the Chinese language in this 
context, remain rather unsure of this change. Is this something of significance 
in the continuing reform of the legal system in China, or is it just another lip-
service in China’s propaganda to present itself as a rule of law country?
Eminent legal scholars have pointed to the different connotations of the rule 
of law and the potential for “promiscuous use”.2 Raz explains that the rule of 
law literally means the rule of the law, and in its broadest sense that people 
should obey the law and be ruled by it. At the same time, the narrower sense 
of the phrase in political and legal theory comes to be read as that the gov-
ernment shall be ruled by the law and subject to it.3 Despite a reversed sense 
of broadness or narrowness, the essence of the different theories of the rule of 
law is largely echoed in Peerenboom’s “thin” and “thick” version of the rule 
of law with a particular focus in the context of China.4 In a similar vein, Orts 
observes that a number of legal theorists have distinguished a prescriptive, 
normative and political view of the relationship between law and the state 
from a descriptive, positive and instrumental view of the two. The latter is 
referred to as rule by law.5
The “rule by law” label certainly has been used frequently enough in this 
area for it to be seen as an effective shorthand to criticize if not mock the 
Chinese system. The media would readily run statements about how China is a 
rule by law country and not a rule of law country, presumably on the assump-
tion that the general public is well versed in the differences. When reporting 
1   Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 5. Translation of the 2004 version 
(no change to Article 5) by the National People’s Congress is available at <http://www.npc 
.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm> accessed 1 January 2019.
2   Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (2nd ed., 2009, Oxford University Press) 211.
3   Raz, 212.
4   Randall Peerenboom, China’s Long March Towards the Rule of Law (2002, Cambridge 
University Press), 3.
5   Eric W. Orts, “The Rule of Law in China” (2001) 34 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 43, 
93–4.
156 Xu
The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 5 (2019) 153–175
on the aforementioned Chinese constitutional amendment in 2018, the Law 
Library of Congress of the United States saw fit to include the only comment in 
its factual news update on the Chinese constitution text of “improve the social-
ist rule of law”, as tersely as “which is effectively rule by law, one could argue”.6 
Even some academic pieces would throw in such a twist as a self-evident con-
clusion, without explaining the notable scope or variants of “rule of law” that 
leading scholars have been discussing over the past decades.7
Whatever the critics sought to achieve with such clever use of terminology, 
they seem oblivious to the important fact that “rule by law” has no capable 
translation into the Chinese language. Consequently, for the vast majority of 
Chinese who do not command the level of English that would enable them 
to read about law and politics in a foreign language, these criticisms from the 
outside are often incomprehensible, thus seemingly unreasonable, once trans-
lated into Chinese.
In the absence of a widely understandable expression in Chinese, some 
have tried to translate “rule by law” as equivalent to “以法治国 yǐ fa zhi guo” 
(govern the nation by law). There are a number of reasons why this would 
be rather unhelpful in explaining the concept to the Chinese audience. The 
phrase was first used by Legalist politicians and philosophers such as Guan 
Zhong (725–645 BC) and Han Fei (279–233 BC),8 but hardly found its way into 
the common parlance for the next two thousand years. This largely forgot-
ten historic phrase may struggle to fit into a role of explaining contemporary 
thinking with all the Legalistic baggage attached to it. At the same time, 
“yǐ fa zhi guo” is a close homophone to “依法治国 yī fa zhi guo” (govern the coun-
try according to law), which is the core value enshrined in the Constitution, 
discussed below.9 The possible confusion inherent in such subtle differences 
would hardly help to clarify the already complex subject matter. Furthermore, 
the phrase, being unused in the past, has never carried any approbative or 
pejorative sense to it, unlike the “rule by law” label in English with its dedicated 
use in criticism. So any criticism that “China is doing yǐ fa zhi guo!” would still 
leave the Chinese audience bewildered as before.
6   Laney Zhang, “China: 2018 Constitutional Amendment Adopted” (Library of Congress, 
18 May 2018) <http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/china-2018-constitutional 
-amendment-adopted/> accessed 1 January 2019.
7   E.g. Chien-yuan Tseng, “Human Rights Are Human Rights: Asian Values, Chinese 
Characteristics and Universal Values” (2017) 3(2) Contemporary Chinese Political Economy 
and Strategic Relations 989, 997.
8  《管子·明法》: “以法治国则举错而已”; 《韩非子·有度》: “故以法治国举措而已矣”.
9   Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 5.
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3 The Two Fa Zhi
Nevertheless, there have been attempts of even worse translation, by equating 
the notion of “法制 fa zhi” (legal system) to “rule by law”. This fa zhi (legal sys-
tem) is a complete homophone to “法治 fa zhi” (rule of law) and the existence 
of two different fa zhi is certainly an easy cause for confusion for non-Chinese 
speakers in this area.10 For example, when Keith observed in 1994 that “during 
the Chinese legal reform of the 1980s, Western commentary … routinely pre-
sumed that any Chinese reference to ‘fazhi’ connoted ‘rule by law’ as opposed 
to ‘rule of law’”, it is unclear which fa zhi the author was referring to.11 Leaving 
aside the confusion of identical pronunciation, fa zhi (legal system) in Chinese 
is still a neutral, if not modestly approbative, term without any derogatory con-
notation. Chinese legal scholars routinely write about not just the fa zhi (legal 
system) of China but the fa zhi (legal system) of other countries. For example, 
there is no indication that when writing about the fa zhi (legal system) of the 
United Kingdom, any Chinese author was in fact commenting on the rule-by-
law status of the country.12
More importantly, the idea of besmirching the connotation of fa zhi (legal 
system) with that of rule by law in English completely disregard the content 
and history behind the two “fa zhi”, which have played pivotal roles in the 
development of law in modern China. In the wake of the catastrophic Cultural 
Revolution, fa zhi (rule of law) was actually the earlier of the two to gain promi-
nence among political and academic discourse at the beginning of the Reform 
and Opening Up in the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, there is no evidence 
to suggest that fa zhi (rule of law) discussed in China at that time had any link 
to the concept or phrase of “rule of law” in English. Instead, fa zhi (rule of law) 
was used in the sense of “governing by law” as opposed to ren zhi (governing 
by men).13 Li Buyun and Wang Liming, both leading scholars at the time and 
for years to come in this area, highlighting the translated expression “to the 
end it may be a government of laws and not of men” from the Constitution of 
Massachusetts, state that “a government of laws and not of men” is definitely 
fa zhi (rule of law).14 Despite what would now seem like an obvious choice, it 
took the conjoined efforts of many to finally deny the legitimacy of any form 
10   Debora Cao, Chinese Law: A Language Perspective (2004, 2016 reprint by Routledge) 42. 
Professor Cao’s helpful approach to label every fa zhi clearly is gratefully adopted in this 
article.
11   Ronald Keith, China’s Struggle for the Rule of Law (1994, Palgrave Macmillan) 1.
12  刘振宇, “英国法制建设的几点启示与借鉴” (2002/02) Contemporary Law Review 105.
13  王礼明, “试论人治与法治” (1979/11) Academic Monthly 22.
14  李步云王礼明, “人治和法治能互相结合吗？” (1980/2) Chinese Journal of Law 40, 45.
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of governing by men and to reach the eventual consensus that ren zhi and 
fa zhi (rule of law) are mutually repugnant and cannot be adopted as some 
form of combination despite early suggestions.15 Fa zhi (rule of law) prevailed 
in the end, but not in the sense that the term is used in English at all. This 
connotation of the Chinese word fa zhi (rule of law) is often overlooked by 
discussions in English, but it continues to be used in contemporary Chinese 
literature without any concern.16
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the rise of fa zhi (rule of law) was abruptly 
interrupted by domestic and international events and the ensuing changes 
in the political atmosphere. Fa zhi (rule of law) largely disappeared from the 
vocabulary of official discourse. Academics, in search for a replacement, opted 
to use the less nuanced term of fa zhi (legal system) instead.17 When the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China issued its major “Decisions” on 
the socialist market economy in 1993, which is often regarded as the historic 
moment to kick-start the stalling Chinese economy, fa zhi (legal system) was 
mentioned nine times while fa zhi (rule of law) was not used at all. A lot of 
work behind the scene was done in order for fa zhi (rule of law) to become 
admissible again. To that extent, fa zhi (rule of law) did remarkably well in 
the next six years, as did the Chinese economy, to be formally codified into the 
Constitution in the 1999 Amendment. Nevertheless, the usage of fa zhi (legal 
system) still outnumbered fa zhi (rule of law) in the Constitution by three to 
one.18 The status of fa zhi (rule of law) also had to contend with novel initiatives 
such as de zhi (rule of virtue), with leading scholars meticulously demarcating 
the boundaries between law and morality.19 It took almost two decades for the 
2018 constitutional amendment to replace one of the three references to fa zhi 
(legal system) with fa zhi (rule of law), so that the terms are now on numeri-
cal parity. Although commentators outside of China could easily dismiss the 
significance of such a seemingly cosmetic change, for many Chinese, including 
scholars who dedicated their careers advocating the importance of fa zhi (rule 
15  何华辉 马克昌 张泉林, “实行法治就要摒弃人治” (1980/4) Chinese Journal of 
Law 62.
16   E.g. 郭晔张文显, “新时代首次修宪的法理基础” (2019/1) Law Review 1, 5.
17  谢海定, “中国法治经济建设的逻辑” (2017/6) Chinese Journal of Law 21, 22.
18   Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (as amended in 1999), Preamble, Article 5 
and Article 24. Professor Cao’s explanation that “fa zhi (rule of law) is the phrase used in 
the Constitution” seems slightly misleading in this context, Cao, Ibid.
19  张骐, “法治的魂与形:兼谈法治与德治的区别与关联” (2018/2) ECPUL Journal 43, 
58–9.
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of law), the subtle change is at least a continued commitment to the progress 
China has undoubtedly made in improving its legal system and the rule of law 
over the past decades as well as the direction of travel for years to come.
Table 1 should hopefully summarize and clarify the discussion so far. There 
is, however, a central issue in this context which has only been mentioned 
in passing, namely the exact meaning of “yī fa zhi guo” (govern the country 
according to law). For a term that has been in the Constitution for twenty years 
and frequently emphasized by the Chinese leader President Xi Jinping, it is 
nevertheless still challenging to convey its exact connotation into the English 
discussion. The Chinese government and the Communist Party tend to use 
yī fa zhi guo as a close synonym and possibly an elaboration of fa zhi (rule of 
law). After all, fa zhi (rule of law) are the two characters literally at the centre 
of yī fa zhi guo. Furthermore, the literal meaning of yī fa zhi guo comes very 
close to the familiar connotation of fa zhi (rule of law) in Chinese as “governing 
by law” as the opposite of ‘governing by men”.
Nonetheless, a significant linguistic difference exists between the Chinese 
term “yī fa zhi guo” and the English term “rule of law”. Raz’s statement, cited 
above, is the clearest in explaining the literal meaning in English, that “the 
table 1 Meaning and sense of relevant terminology in English and Chinese
Chinese Sense Meaning English Sense
法制
(fa zhi  
“legal system”)
neutral legal system legal system neutral
法治 
(fa zhi  
“rule of law”)
approbative the political view or  
ideal where the people  
and (more importantly)  
the government are subject 
to and ruled by the law




approbative governing by law, as  
opposed to governing  
by men
government of laws 
(and not of men)
neutral
依法治国 
(yī fa zhi  
guo)
approbative ??? govern the country  
according to law
neutral
NONE NONE the positivism concept of 
governing by established 
law, often associated with 
authoritarian regimes
rule by law pejorative
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rule of law … is the rule of the law”.20 The literal expression makes it explicit 
that it is the law that rules, not any other entity. As to whether the law rules 
over the people, or the government, or both, the expression itself is silent. 
In English, the subject (the law) of the ruling is clear while the object is not. In 
the Chinese expression yī fa zhi guo, however, the law is clearly not the rul-
ing entity. Someone or something else rules the country according to law. The 
expression is silent on who exactly rules. In contrast to the English translation, 
the Chinese expression stipulates the object (the country) but not the subject, 
while “yī fa” (according to law) only functions as the adverbial. The Chinese 
Constitution offers little help here by stating that “the People’s Republic of 
China governs the country according to law”.21 That, with respect, is a mere 
tautology without identifying who or what governs the People’s Republic.
Furthermore, the ambiguity of the term is compounded by the scope of the 
expression fa or fa lü for “law” in Chinese. As Chinese scholars have noted, 
Chinese and English seem to be the two major languages that do not inher-
ently distinguish between law as an abstract concept of some universality 
and law as the actual collective of rules enacted by the State, unlike Latin 
(ius and lex), Spanish (derecho and ley), Italian (dritto and legge), French (droit 
and loi), German (Recht and Gesetz) or Turkish (hukuk and kanun).22 It remains 
to be seen whether whoever “governs China according to law” governs it only 
according to the law as enacted by the National People’s Congress, or some 
abstract sense of law of more universality and values that is not limited in such 
a formalistic way.
4 Miscommunication between Chinese and English
All such linguistic and cultural differences, as well as quite often poor transla-
tions done without appreciating the implications of the admittedly confusing 
terminology, often lead to the message being lost in communication between 
China and the outside. When someone says in English “China is not a rule-of-
law country but a rule-by-law country”, it is unlikely for the person to realize 
that the second half of this simple statement would be nearly impossible to 
translate into Chinese. Hence for the Chinese audience, only the first half of 
20   Raz, 212.
21   Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 5.
22  张骐等, 中国司法先例与案例指导制度研究 <Study on Chinese Judicial Precedents 
and the System of Case Guiding> (2016, Peking University Press) 8.
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this message gets through, effectively that China is not a country with fa zhi 
(rule of law). This then in turn produces a response from the Chinese side that 
China is indeed a rule-of-law country. The Chinese speaker, be it a diplomat 
or a scholar, could well have been thinking about the prominent distinction 
between fa zhi (rule of law) and ren zhi (governing by men) that the Chinese 
collective understanding has embraced for forty years. The Chinese have 
always been informed that governing the country according to law is definitely 
the rule of law. Thus, it is completely understandable that many would firmly 
believe that China has some form of rule of law. “The rule of law is a political 
ideal which a legal system may lack or possess to a greater or lesser degree.”23 
Despite shortcomings in various aspects of the law, which many Chinese would 
readily admit even criticize, they would struggle to subscribe to the accusation 
that China, having travelled so far from the era of ren zhi, still does not have at 
least some degree of fa zhi (rule of law).
There is no easy solution to address such prevalent miscommunication. 
On the one hand, China would need to develop the collective understanding 
of the concept of rule of law to that beyond the traditional dichotomy of gov-
erning by law or governing by men. As Peerenboom points out, “China lacks the 
soft power to challenge the global dominance of the liberal democratic con-
ception of rule of law” and “critics at home and abroad will, fairly or unfairly, 
continue to assess reforms and measure China against the standard of liberal 
democratic rule of law”.24
On the other hand, the rule of law should not be used by critics of China as 
a blanket catch-all instrument that denotes everything negative about China 
or the Chinese government. “It is also to be insisted that the rule of law is just 
one of the virtues which a legal system may possess … It is not to be confused 
with democracy, justice, equality … human rights of any kind …”25 In schol-
arly writings in particular, the irresponsible branding of issues as rule-of-law 
related does disservice not only to the efforts to improve the law in China or 
elsewhere but to the integrity and credibility of the rule of law concept as 
a whole. For example, in a recent article assessing the impact of trade with 
Mainland China on the rule of law in Hong Kong and Taiwan, a commentator 
categorized numerous issues in relation to “freedom of expression, freedom 
of speech and freedom of thought and conscience” as evidence of “erosion of 
23   Raz, 211.
24   Randall Peerenboom, “Fly High the Banner of Socialist Rule of Law with Chinese Charac-
teristics!” (2015) Hague Journal of Rule of Law 49, 72–3.
25   Raz, 211.
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the rule of law”.26 Inexplicably, the case then used as evidence of such ero-
sion was where a Hong Kong court ruled that freedom of expression would not 
be a defence in criminal desecration of the national or regional flag.27 With 
the greatest respect, do all countries with well-established rule-of-law, such 
as France,28 Germany,29 New Zealand30 amongst others, allow desecration of 
their national flags as freedom of expression? Is it not a basic tenet of the rule 
of law that the promulgated law of a jurisdiction, not to mention criminal law, 
should be obeyed by its citizens?
It suffices to say that the potential gap in understanding and communi-
cation between Chinese speakers and English speakers in this regard would 
continue to exist. Instead of generalizing all political and law-related issues as 
some examination of rule of law in China, it may be more helpful to examine 
some important development in the fundamental mechanics of the Chinese 
legal system with more profound impact on the law in China.
5 Guiding Cases and Chinese Characteristics
Neither the publication of decided cases by the Supreme Court nor the atten-
tion paid to such practice is new in the study of Chinese law over the past 
decades.31 There was, for example, reflection on the scrutiny from “Western 
scholars” in the early 1990s on the publication of the Gazette of the Supreme 
People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China.32 More recently, the attention 
tends to focus on the new system of “guiding cases” published by the Supreme 
People’s Court, which was first announced in 2010 and commenced in 2011.33 
26   Chien Huei Wu, “Dance with the Dragon: Close Economic Integration with China and 
Deteriorating Democracy and Rule of Law in Taiwan and Hong Kong?” (2015) Hong Kong 
Law Journal 275, 276–7.
27   HKSAR v Ng Kung Siu (1999) 2 HKCFAR 442.
28   Code pénal, Article 433–5-1.
29   Strafgesetzbuches, s.90a.
30   Flags, Emblems, and Names Protection Act 1981, s.11.
31   It is noted that the Supreme People’s Procuratorate has also been publish guiding cases. 
However, given their nature and the limited scope within criminal prosecution, it is left 
out of the current discussion on the more general aspects of the use of cases in Chinese 
law.
32   Nanping Liu, “‘Legal Precedents’ with Chinese Characteristics: Published Cases in the 
Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court” (1991) 5 Journal of Chinese Law 107, 107.
33   For a helpful account of the history and structure of the system of guiding cases, see 
Anonymous, “Chinese Common Law? Guiding Cases and Judicial Reform” (2016) 129 
Harvard Law Review 2213.
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As of the end of 2018, there are 106 guiding cases covering many areas of 
civil, criminal and administrative law as well as enforcement of judgments. 
In October 2018, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
adopted amendments to the Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the People’s 
Republic of China, adding the provision that “the Supreme People’s Court may 
publish guiding cases”.34
Some commentators seem to allude to a link between the publication of 
guiding cases in China and the Common Law tradition.35 Although such a 
label makes interesting titles, it is rather premature to find any substantive 
connection between these new guiding cases and the common law. As oth-
ers have noted, the Chinese practice seems to be more analogous to the use 
of cases in Civil Law jurisdictions rather than in the Common Law tradition.36 
In this regard, Chinese scholars have typically examined German law as 
the prime example of the use of cases in a Civil Law country, with notable 
efforts to explain and analyse concepts such as “Präjudiz” and “Richterrecht”.37 
Nevertheless, perhaps the more prevailing view among Chinese scholar is that 
the Chinese system has notable “Chinese characteristics” not seen in other 
Common Law or Civil Law countries, even if there are many shared functions 
and reasons for using cases in any legal system.38 Some of these Chinese char-
acteristics are certainly significant enough to render the choice between Civil 
Law or Common Law as the better analogy almost a non-question.
In the first place, the Supreme People’s Court select guiding cases from all 
levels of courts in China, including more than 3,000 basic people’s court at 
the bottom of the court hierarchy. Among the first 92 guiding cases published 
by the end of 2017, 18 of these were decisions by the basic people’s courts.39 
34   Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the People’s Republic of China (as amended on 
26 October 2018), Article 18.
35   E.g. Jocelyn Limmer, “China’s New Common Law: Using China’s Guiding Cases to 
Understand How to Do Business in the People’s Republic of China” (2013) 21 Williamette 
Journal of International Law & Dispute Resolution 96; Danny Friedmann, “IP in China: 
Moving closer to the common law system for the sake of uniformity” (2017) 12 Journal of 
Intellectual Property Law & Practice 621.
36   Anonymous, “Chinese Common Law? Guiding Cases and Judicial Reform” (2016) 129 
Harvard Law Review 2213, 2232.
37   E.g. 张骐 等, 中国司法先例与案例指导制度研究 <Study on Chinese Judicial Prec-
edents and the System of Case Guiding> (2016, Peking University Press) 104; 陈兴良 (ed.) 
中国案例指导制度研究 <Chinese System of Directive Cases> (2014, Peking University 
Press) 712.
38   E.g. 张志铭, “司法判例制度构建的法理基础” (2013) 7 Tsinghua Law Journal 91, 92.
39  北大法律信息网, “最高人民法院指导性案例2017 年度司法应用报告” <http://
weekly.pkulaw.cn/Admin/Content/Static/374cc337-9ede-4377-8606-bd2313f9f78.html> 
accessed 1 January 2019.
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In other words, these are first instance decisions not having been subject to 
any appeal, yet are then elevated to the status of guiding cases of national 
importance soon after. From the Common Law perspective, such as in England 
and Wales, first instance decisions have little binding force on any court of 
equal jurisdiction.40 From the Civil Law perspective, such as in France, any 
legal precedent only becomes a de facto (but not de jure) authority until “it is 
definitely fixed by the repetition of precedents which are in agreement on a 
single point”.41 Chinese guiding cases are constrained by neither the necessary 
appellate status of the court making the decision nor the repetition of other 
courts in approval. It is a matter of being approved by the Supreme People’s 
Court independent of any litigation after the original decision.
At the same time, guiding cases are subject to edit by the Supreme People’s 
Court not only for the highlighting of the legal principles involved but also pos-
sible rewriting of both the text of the court reasoning and some factual aspects 
of the original litigation.42 There is no indication that the changes made by 
the Supreme People’s Court have created any material difference from the 
original court decision. Often the edits emphasize or make it explicit what 
the original decision was inferring to. Still, guiding cases are edited as con-
densed models or good examples, instead of the full decision announced by 
the court originally. Volume-wise, a typical guiding case would fit a couple 
of A4 pages while the original decision handed down by the court nowadays 
could easily span 15 or 20 pages.
It may thus be observed that the system of guiding cases is essentially an 
instrument of the Supreme People’s Court that would convey accelerated and 
concentrated judicial opinions from the highest court in the country to all the 
courts below. It does not wait for the ideal case to be thoroughly examined on 
appeal and it could, modestly at least, modify a usable case to suit the need of 
providing guidance. Unlike Common Law precedents, guiding cases are not 
established by the appellate courts in their judicial decision-making due to 
their elevated position on the hierarchy of courts. And unlike Civil Law prec-
edents, guiding cases are not dependent on any consensus built up in a series 
of decisions by different judges.
The pressing question following such an understanding is what differ-
ence the new system of guiding cases would make to the operation and 
40   Rupert Cross & J.W. Harris, Precedent in English Law (1991, 4th ed., Clarendon Press) 122.
41   Edouard Lambert & Max J. Wasserman, “The Case Method in Canada and the Possibilities 
of its Adaptation to the Civil Law” (1929) 39 Yale Law Journal 1, 15.
42   For an example of the extent of editing, see Stanford Law School China Guiding Cases 
Project, “Guiding Case No. 1” <https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases/guiding-case-1/> 
 accessed 1 January 2019.
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development of Chinese law. From the start, guiding cases are different from 
those hundreds of cases selected and published by the Supreme People’s Court 
since the 1980s in that they are given a formal role in the judicial decision-
making process. The Supreme People’s Court first promulgated Provisions in 
2010 and then Detailed Rules in 2015 in relation to guiding cases, both stat-
ing that courts at all levels “should” (ying dang 应当) “refer to” (can zhao 
参照) guiding cases when adjudicating similar cases.43 Although for layper-
sons and those not familiar with the subtlety of legislative language in China 
the word “should” may appear ambiguous,44 it essentially reads as “must” (bi xu 
必须) and is the preferred choice of wording for imposing obligations in legis-
lation.45 The Detailed Rules also state that the court should cite guiding cases 
as part of the “reasoning” of any decision, but not the “basis” for making such 
a decision.46 This largely conforms with the prevalent academic assessment 
that guiding cases now have de facto binding force but are not de jure law.47 
This rather intriguing position is perhaps a reflection of the long-term unease 
the judiciary have harboured of being accused of making law in a system which 
is clearly Civil Law based without any Common Law heritage, especially when 
questioned in relation to legislative functions in competition with the National 
People’s Congress.48 In this regard, the recognition of the ongoing publication 
of guiding cases by the legislator in the aforementioned 2018 amendments to 
the Organic Law of the People’s Court is highly significant, as the first ever 
mention of the use of cases in primary legislation. Interestingly, the legislation 
is completely silent as to what legal effect, if any, guiding cases would have. 
In other words, it is a nod by the National People’s Congress to the Supreme 
People’s Court to carry on with what it is doing without clarifying what the 
practice means.
43   Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Work on Case Guidance (最高人
民法院关于案例指导工作的规定) (26 November 2010), Article 7; Detailed Rules for 
the Implementation of the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Work on 
Case Guidance (最高人民法院关于案例指导工作的规定实施细则) (13 May 2015), 
Article 9.
44   Anonymous, “Chinese Common Law? Guiding Cases and Judicial Reform” (2016) 129 
Harvard Law Review 2213, 2223 fn 87.
45   Legislative Affairs Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress, “Technical Standard for Legislation (Trial Implementation) (Part One)” 
(《立法技术规范（试行）（一）》法工委发 [2009] 62 号), Article 14.
46   Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court 
Concerning Work on Case Guidance, Article 10.
47  泮伟江, “论指导性案例的效力” (2016) 10 Tsinghua University Law Journal 20, 21.
48  雷磊, “指导性案例法源地位再反思” (2015) China Legal Science 272, 286.
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And it seems that the Supreme People’s Court has been emboldened by 
such gesture and would carry on developing the institution of guiding cases. 
December 2018 saw 10 guiding cases published, making this the most produc-
tive month so far since these started in 2012. Nevertheless, the continuing 
growth of guiding cases may well force Chinese law to come to terms with a 
crucial choice sooner rather than later, namely what role do other cases play 
in the legal system. One possibility is that an established structure of guiding 
cases may pave the way for more accomplished use of cases in Chinese law 
as judges and practitioners become more familiar with the methods and phi-
losophy. The lead and effort by the Supreme People’s Court in this regard may 
well be instrumental in educating a system which have often shown reluctance 
towards case law as a product of the Common Law tradition. Yet another pos-
sibility, often overlooked, is that guiding cases would take over and become the 
only cases the court is allowed to consider, thus significantly limiting rather 
than enhancing the use of cases in Chinese law.
6 The Wider Use of Cases
Despite the lack of de jure recognition and de facto binding effect, cases have 
been studied and used in practice before and after the inception of the current 
system of guiding cases.49 After all, treating like cases alike is a well understood 
basic principle in China as much as it is elsewhere.50 Nevertheless, the ascen-
dency of guiding cases have now led to the questioning of the use of any other 
case in the court recently.
In many litigations, the fact that a court had taken in to consideration 
decided cases which were not guiding cases came under fire by parties on 
appeal or when applying for a retrial.51 The logic behind such an argument is 
understandable, though arguably erroneous, especially when assessed in the 
context that parties would be clutching at straws when trying to challenge a 
decision. Given the special status of guiding cases, some would expectedly 
argue any case that does not qualify as the guiding case must be treated less 
49  周道鸾. “中国案例制度的历史发展” (2004) Journal of Law Application 1, 5–7.
50  张骐等, 中国司法先例与案例指导制度研究 <Study on Chinese Judicial Precedents 
and the System of Case Guiding> (2016, Peking University Press) 7.
51   E.g. 江苏仪建建设集团有限公司 v 阳光财产保险股份有限公司青海省分公司,
最高人民法院, (2017) 最高法民终 166 号 (28 June 2017); 白城市红日路桥建设有限
公司 v 白山市市政建设有限公司, 吉林省高级人民法院, (2018) 吉民终 218 号 
(20 June 2018); 七台河嘉晨选煤有限公司 v 孙凤才, 黑龙江省七台河市中级人民
法院, (2018) 黑 09 民终 550 号 (17 December 2018).
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favourably. On most occasions, the court chose to not respond to such an argu-
ment in its judgment. Nevertheless, some dismissal of non-guiding cases came 
from the court without obvious prompt by the parties. Some of these com-
ments were evidently reasonable without much controversy, such as where 
the convicted defendants cited a case and its analysis from a law journal as 
grounds for appealing the conviction. Even though the judgment did not iden-
tify the case nor the journal, it stated that the court should apply the law and 
not the opinions in journal articles, subject to the exception that the court “may” 
refer to guiding cases published by the Supreme People’s Court.52 Nevertheless, 
at times the court have spontaneously pointed out the fact that a case relied 
by one party is not a guiding case, even if the case was published through offi-
cial channels such as the Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court.53 Notably, even 
the Supreme People’s Court itself, in dismissing the relevance of a cited case, 
would draw attention to the fact that a recent decision by the Supreme People’s 
Court is not a guiding case.54 Moreover, the Supreme People’s Court explicitly 
rejected the submission from one party to “refer” to a case in the Gazette of 
the Supreme People’s Court, on the ground that it was not a guiding case,55 
despite the fact that the case remains well publicized on its own website.56
All these cases expose a significant side-effect of the increasing prominence 
of guiding cases that has rarely been contemplated in the promotion of the 
idea. In order to avoid overstepping the line between adjudicating and legislat-
ing, the judiciary have been careful in saying as little as possible regarding the 
official and practical status of cases for decades. The permission in the Organic 
Law that the Supreme People’s Court “may” publish guiding cases and the rule 
that all levels of the court “should” “refer” to guiding cases are major break-
throughs in this regard. Yet the chronic silence over the past decades is now 
leading to a somewhat inevitable confrontation between the sanctioned use 
of guiding cases and the practical role played by cases in Chinese law at all 
levels of the court system. Although the Organic Law and the Detailed Rules 
52  钟占伦、钟占凤挪用公款二审刑事裁定书, 贵州省黔东南苗族侗族自治州中级
人民法院, (2018) 黔 26 刑终 246 号 (17 December 2018). The wording of “may” (可以) is 
an intriguing departure from the Supreme People’s Court’s stipulation of “should” (应当).
53  上海易程集装罐运输服务有限公司 v 陕西省蒲城县人民法院,陕西省高级人民
法院赔偿委员会, (2018) 陕委赔监 26 号 (24 December 2018).
54  中国建设银行股份有限公司榆林新建南路支行 v 榆林聚能物流有限责任公司,
最高人民法院, (2017) 最高法民终 170 号 (17 November 2017).
55  黄木兴 v 四川中南明大置业投资有限公司, 最高人民法院, (2014) 民申字第 441
号 (4 June 2014).
56   “吴国军诉陈晓富、王克祥及德清县中建房地产开发有限公司民间借贷、担保
合同纠纷案” <http://gongbao.court.gov.cn/Details/79f4435dbaf56dbd78e713f435c320 
.html> accessed 1 January 2019.
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authorize, even prescribe, the reference to guiding cases, there has never been 
any indication that anyone envisaged guiding cases as the only group of cases 
to be referred to. Indeed, the expectation, if not plan, has always been that with 
the increasing awareness and capabilities of using guiding cases, the Chinese 
system will gradually make better use of cases in general.57 Although it has 
never been suggested that China will ever recognize principles such as stare 
decisis, the notion of establishing “case law” to some extent and in some forms 
has certainly been a popular topic of academic discussion.58
It seems important that the Supreme People’s Court among others should 
take the lead on clarifying this matter of legal principle and practical signifi-
cance. At least it should be made clear that the Organic Law and rules which 
require the court to refer to guiding cases do not prohibit the use of other non-
guiding cases. Although the status of a guiding case should be afforded due 
consideration by the court and the parties, the fact that any case is not a guid-
ing case should not be seen as the reason to dismiss or ignore it. Chinese law 
would need more than 106, 200, or 500 cases in the coming decades. For the 
court in general, keeping a low-profile on the issue of using cases might have 
worked in the past, but it is likely to be more and more difficult now that par-
ties start questioning every case not on the hallowed list of guiding cases.
At the same time, this crucial period in the development of Chinese law 
also poses considerable challenges to scholarly studies of the changing system. 
For decades, cases were not an important part in the examination of Chinese 
law. There are two main explanations for this. Doctrinally, as mentioned above, 
China follows the Civil Law tradition and does not officially recognize the role 
of case law. More practically, cases are decided by more than three thousand 
courts all over the country and nobody could have kept track of even the most 
important ones without established mechanisms such as indexing or case 
reporting.59 Although the court judgment in most cases would be a public 
document theoretically open to everybody, very few would have the knowl-
edge, time and resources to access these. Only a very small number of cases 
get selected into more widely available publications such as the Gazette of the 
Supreme People’s Court or other case compilations, occasionally discussed in 
academic discourse.
57  汤文平, “中国特色判例制度之系统发动” (2018/6) The Jurist 49, 62.
58  张骐, “判例法的比较研究” (2002/4) Journal of Comparative Law 79, 91; 何然, “司法判
例制度论要” (2014/1) Peking University Law Journal 234, 256.
59   An established system of law reports is certainly seen as a systemic strength of a Common 
Law jurisdiction, which China did not have and would have difficulty in trying to emulate, 
see 张骐, “判例法的比较研究” (2002/4) Journal of Comparative Law 79, 82.
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Nevertheless, the practical situation of a scarcity of cases was reversed 
within a very short period of time, almost simultaneous to the development of 
the system of guiding cases, when the Supreme People’s Court started in 2013 
to require all decisions by all courts in China to be uploaded onto its online 
database, China Judgements Online.60 Subject to exceptions such as cases 
involving national secrets, criminal proceedings against minors, divorce pro-
ceedings or other cases considered inappropriate for online publication,61 the 
court “should” publish any decision within seven working days of it taking legal 
effect.62 Even for any case deemed unsuitable for online publication, the court 
should publish the case number, the court of the judgment, the date of the 
judgment and the reasons for not publishing the judgment, unless where this 
information would compromise national secrets.63
Perhaps not every court adheres to what they “should” or must do all the 
time. For example, the Supreme People’s Court reported 19.77 million deci-
sions by all courts in 2016,64 but only 12.25 million documents dated to 2016 
have been included in the database. There are also duplications of the same 
document and multiple documents in relation to the same proceedings. Still 
the reality is that more than 15 million cases have been published each year 
in 2017 and 2018. At the latest number count of over 60 million judgments 
at the end of 2018, this may indeed be the largest database of judicial deci-
sions in the world, as claimed by the Supreme People’s Court,65 not to mention 
the fact that it grows by about 50,000 cases every working day. Even though the 
database is equipped with standard functions such as full-text search, filtering 
and sorting, the scale is simply overwhelming for any traditional approach in 
identifying and examining relevant cases. There has been no suggestion as to 
how the examination of even a specific area of Chinese law could approach 
this behemoth task in a methodological and rigorous way.
While the puzzle of scholarly examination remains to be solved, the court 
in China are certainly making use of the massive wealth of judicial wisdom 
now easily accessible from any computer. The same database now also pro-
vides more and more instances of how cases are actually used in Chinese 
60  <http://wenshu.court.gov.cn/> accessed 1 January 2019.
61   Supreme People’s Court, “最高人民法院关于人民法院在互联网公布裁判文书的规
定”(法释[2016] 19号), Article 4.
62   Ibid., Article 7.
63   Ibid., Article 6.
64  周强, “最高人民法院工作报告” (12 March 2017) <http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun 
-xiangqing-37852.html> accessed 1 January 2019.
65   Supreme People’s Court, “最高法院召开司法公开工作座谈会” (28 February 2018) 
<http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-82532.html> accessed 1 January 2019.
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law even without any official recognition. In a recent case from Beijing, for 
example, the claimant and defendants were members of a peer-to-peer loan 
bidding association (标会 biao hui), which in essence collects agreed contribu-
tion from each member to be lent to the highest bidder for the sum among the 
members. When some disputes in relation to repayment of the sum ended up 
in litigation, the first instance court comprising a deputy judge sitting on her 
own, took this as ordinary private lending and worked out the arrangement of 
capital repayment and interest accordingly.66 On appeal, however, the Third 
Intermediate People’s Court of Beijing were more hesitant over the nature of 
the alleged debt in relation to the participation of such peer-to-peer associa-
tion. The court explicitly stated that, after examining judgments of relevant 
cases published on China Judgements Online in recent years, it came to the 
view that such activities were common to the coastal regions in the Southeast, 
with most of the decided cases coming from Fujian Province there. And from 
these judgments, the court concluded that the courts in Fujian Province mostly 
refused to accept the activities of these peer-to-peer associations as lawful 
private lending, due to non-compliance with finance regulations and the com-
monplace risks both financially and legally. The claim and counterclaim were 
then dismissed by the appeal court.67 The dissatisfied claimant later applied 
for a retrial in the High People’s Court of Beijing, arguing that the appeal court 
relied on non-guiding cases from Fujian Province, while the case only con-
cerned parties currently resident in Beijing (despite all of them being from 
Fujian originally). Disappointingly perhaps for interested observers, the High 
People’s Court did not venture to answer this highly enticing criticism and sim-
ply dismissed the application for a retrial within one succinct paragraph.68
Cases such as these offer fascinating insight into the realm of Chinese law 
largely impervious to scholarly examination until now. There have always been 
observations and comments on how important cases are in the practice of 
Chinese law, not only from academics but sometimes also from the court. Yet 
there is little understanding of how cases are actually discovered or considered 
by the court. In the Beijing lending association case, for instance, both sides 
were represented by the same attorneys throughout the three hearings. Did 
either of the attorneys cite those decisive cases to the appellate court? And 
what factors would influence the court on deciding whether to rely on or disre-
gard a decision? Without any indication that the law in Beijing is any different 
66  傅清月 v 黄心庆,北京市朝阳区人民法院, (2018) 京0105民初7227号 (22 February 
2018).
67  黄心庆 v 傅清月,北京市第三中级人民法院, (2018)京03民终7142号 (25 June 2018).
68  傅清月 v 黄心庆,北京市高级人民法院, (2018)京民申2212号 (21 December 2018).
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from that of any other province of China, would cases from, say Fujian, be less 
persuasive than cases from Beijing for a court in Beijing? The questions would 
quickly queue up for only one case. Yet there may be dozens more waiting to 
be examined in the search for a better and more realistic understanding of 
Chinese law.
In his seminal work on the topic of case law in 2002, Zhang Qi envisaged 
a number of difficulties in constructing a system of case law with Chinese 
characteristics.69 There have certainly been changes in some aspects of these 
difficulties, for example the limited length of judgments in general, while oth-
ers may well remain, such as the considerable diversity of China geographically 
and structurally. Both the system of guiding cases and the China Judgements 
Online database are having profound impacts on how cases are studied and 
used in Chinese law. Although China is still as far away from adopting any 
notion of Common Law as it has ever been, it may be suggested that the 
emerging system of case law is tentatively making progress, often away from 
the limelight of guiding cases. And it is up to judges, practitioners and scholars 
with their interest in Chinese law to examine, explain and extrapolate these 
important developments of the law at a challenging and exciting time for the 
country and its legal system.
7 China International Commercial Court and the Belt and Road 
Initiative
At the same time, the current approach of the Chinese court in using cases 
without making clear as to the basic principles and perimeters of such usage 
is arguably an important aspect of the “Chinese characteristics” of the social-
ist rule of law that the system commits to pursue. Such a theme will be largely 
familiar to political and other social scientists who study China, where prag-
matism is often seen as the foremost feature of “Chinese characteristics”, 
especially among scholars from outside of China.70 Debates such as whether 
the “socialism with Chinese characteristics” is a new socialism or a new capital-
ism have long become clichés,71 with China freely adopting values and policies 
from both camps that suit its need. Of course, neither the Communism Party 
69  张骐, “判例法的比较研究” (2002/4) Journal of Comparative Law 79, 93–4.
70  李荷英 秦益成, “国外学者论中国特色社会主义与中国模式述评” (2010/2) Man-
agement and Review of Social Science 87, 92.
71  郑杭生, “改革开放三十年社会发展理论和社会转型理论” (2009/2) Social Sciences 
in China 10, 16.
172 Xu
The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 5 (2019) 153–175
nor the Chinese government has ever endorsed any suggestion that Mainland 
China would be capitalistic to any extent. In this sense, law is no different to 
other crucial areas of governance in China. It is likely that no Chinese court 
will ever endorse Common Law as part of the principle or practice of Chinese 
law. Nevertheless, the official stance that China is not a Common Law country 
will not prevent the court from creating some de facto system of case law that will 
be far more powerful than that seen in other Civil Law jurisdictions. In this 
regard, the Belt and Road Initiative, which dominates many aspects of China’s 
current international and domestic agenda, may inject added incentives for 
Chinese law to become more Common Law or case law compatible.
In June 2018, the Supreme People’s Court announced the establishment of 
China International Commercial Court (CICC),72 colloquially dubbed as the 
“Belt and Road Court”. It may be noted that translation difficulty is again mildly 
problematic in this context, in that the English word “court” is used for two 
Chinese words of distinct meaning, namely fa yuan (法院) and fa ting (法庭). 
Fa yuan denotes the collective structure of a court, such as the Supreme People’s 
Court or the High People’s Court of any province. Fa ting or simply ting as an 
abbreviation is a division or branch within a court normally specializing in one 
subject such as criminal law or civil law, or more specifically the actual venue 
where a court hearing takes place. The CICC is a fa ting, i.e. branch, within the 
Supreme People’s Court and hence not a separate institution. As things stand, 
the Supreme People’s Court has 19 other divisions or branches known as fa ting 
or ting, variedly translated into English as “courts” or “tribunals”.73 The CICC in 
turn has two branches, with the First International Commercial Court based 
in Shenzhen in the south of country and the Second International Commercial 
Court based in Xi’an in the northwest. This geographic separation is intended 
to naturally direct cases in relation to the Maritime Silk Road (the sea-based 
“Road”) towards Shenzhen and cases along the Silk Road Economic Belt (the 
land-based “Belt”) to Xi’an.74
72   Supreme People’s Court, “最高人民法院关于设立国际商事法庭若干问题的规定” 
(法释[2018] 11 号) “Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concern-
ing the Establishment of the International Commercial Courts”, translation available 
on Stanford Law School China Guiding Cases Project <https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/
belt-and-road/b-and-r-texts/20180701-provisions-re-intl-commercial-courts/> accessed 
1 January 2019.
73   Supreme People’s Court, “Organization Chart” <http://english.court.gov.cn/organization 
.html> accessed 1 January 2019.
74   For a more detailed account of the CICC, see Siyi Lin, “China’s International Commercial 
Court under the Belt and Road Initiative” (2018) International Company and Commer-
cial Law Review 664.
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The CICC specializes in foreign-related civil, commercial and maritime dis-
putes, similar to the pre-existent Civil Adjudication Tribunal No. 4 within the 
Supreme People’s Court. Any case must be foreign-related (including Hong 
Kong, Macau or Taiwan) for it to be considered by the CICC, while the main 
threshold is where the monetary amount in dispute exceeds 300 million RMB. 
Unlike the Civil Adjudication Tribunal No. 4 and indeed almost all other divi-
sions of the Supreme People’s Court, however, the CICC only deals with first 
instance cases directly submitted to its jurisdiction. More importantly, as the 
CICC is part of the Supreme People’s Court, its first instance decision is final, 
takes legal effect immediately and not subject to any appeal.75 In theory, noth-
ing in the law seems to prevent a possible application to the Supreme People’s 
Court asking for a retrial after the CICC decision has already taken legal 
effect. In practice, the Supreme People’s Court almost never hear cases at first 
instance nowadays, so it is largely unknown how the retrial application against 
a non-appealed first instance decision would unfold, if this is ever attempted 
by any party. In December 2018, the CICC announced on its website that it was 
already in the process of trying several cases involving foreign companies from 
Japan, Thailand, the Virgin Islands and so on. Under the current framework of 
unappealable first instance decisions, it would be highly interesting to moni-
tor how the CICC deal with any case cited to it, as well as the weight it affords 
to its own decisions in future litigation as time goes on. Indeed, the CICC has 
already been publishing a number of “typical cases” and “model cases”, mainly 
foreign-related decisions of various Chinese courts from previous years, in 
both Chinese and English on its official website.76 It is extremely unlikely that 
the CICC would simply dismiss any relevant case on the grounds that it is not a 
guiding case and China is not a country of case law. As the highest court in the 
country, it is almost certain that the CICC will never be bound by any decision 
anywhere. But this should come as no surprise even for some Common Law 
jurisdictions. The House of Lords in the UK, for example, famously declared 
that it would depart from its own decisions when “it appears right to do so”.77
And despite the lack of any official acknowledgement of even any inten-
tion to engage with the Common Law tradition in the operation of the CICC, 
there are interesting signs of the awareness of the connection between the 
Common Law and courts for international commercial disputes. For exam-
ple, official publications from the court system specifically compare the CICC 
75   Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the People’s Republic of China, Article 11.
76   China International Commercial Court, “Typical Cases” <http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html 
/1/219/199/204/index.html> accessed 1 January 2019.
77   Practice Statement [1966] 3 All ER 77.
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to the Singapore International Commercial Court, the Abu Dhabi Global 
Market Courts (United Arab Emirates) and the Astana International Financial 
Centre Court (Kazakhstan).78 Meanwhile, Chinese academic discussions 
have examined the Common Law strength of Singapore in establishing the 
International Commercial Court,79 the adoption of Common Law rules by 
the Abu Dhabi Global Market Courts,80 and the implementation of Common 
Law at Astana International Financial Centre Court.81 It is evident that China 
is well aware of the dominance of the Common Law tradition and the English 
language in the context of international commercial courts and the difficulty 
that China will face if it chooses to ignore them.82
On the usage of English in court proceedings, the CICC’s rule allowing evi-
dences to be submitted in English without a Chinese translation, if consented 
to by the parties, is seen as a major breakthrough, even though it theoretically 
contravenes the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China.83 There 
is no indication that such a technicality would be a problem for the CICC or 
the Supreme People’s Court. Still, the influence or acceptance of some sort of 
case law, would be a much more significant breakthrough if it ever happens at 
the CICC. Yet this would probably take a far less conspicuous form than any 
express provisions from the Supreme People’s Court. It is certainly something 
worth keeping an eye on.
8 Conclusion
As China’s influence grow on the modern world, Chinese law understandably 
becomes an important topic for many in China and abroad, whether it is seen 
as an important part of the continuing progress or a major reason to continue 
the criticism of the Chinese government and the Communism Party. This arti-
cle sets out to explain some of the mismatch between the wording and their 
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meanings in English and Chinese, which could have contributed towards some 
of the misunderstanding among the divergent views on issues such as the rule 
of law in China. Chinese law has a lot that need to be improved upon. Yet inju-
dicious analyses by categorizing every law-related issue as a matter for the rule 
of law or simplistic labelling such as “rule by law”, which is not understood in 
Chinese, would only serve to undermine any legitimate or constructive criti-
cism of the current flaws of Chinese law.
In the meantime, major changes are taking place around some of the funda-
mental mechanics of Chinese law, sometimes away from the attention from the 
outside. The system of guiding cases from the Supreme People’s Court makes 
notable differences to the formal role played by cases in the Chinese system, 
especially lately after its succinct recognition, but not full elaboration, in the 
Organic Law of the People’s Court. Yet the small number of guiding cases are 
only the tip of a much larger iceberg of the much wider use of cases in China. 
The establishment of the world’s largest judicial decisions database offers a 
challenging and invaluable opportunity in understanding the under-examined 
principles and practice of case use in thousands of courts.
And although China will probably never become a Common Law jurisdic-
tion, its pragmatic adoption of many opposing values in the name of “Chinese 
characteristics” would leave the avenue open to the possibility of a new sys-
tem of case law. Where the system of guiding cases has provided an example 
structure, the China International Commercial Court under the Belt and Road 
Initiative could well be the stage for cases to play a far more prominent role 
in Chinese law. These are arguably the most exciting perspectives of ongoing 
changes in Chinese law that warrant further observation and more detailed 
academic examination.
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